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Abstract
Illegal immigration has been the focus of much debate in receiving countries,
but little is known about what drives individual attitudes towards illegal immi-
grants. To study this question, we use the CCES survey, which was carried out in
2006 in the United States. We ¯nd evidence that { in addition to standard labor
market and welfare state considerations { media exposure is signi¯cantly correlated
with public opinion on illegal immigration. Controlling for education, income and
ideology, individuals watching Fox News are 9 percentage points more likely than
CBS viewers to oppose the legalization of undocumented immigrants. We ¯nd an
e®ect of the same size and direction for CNN viewers, whereas individuals watching
PBS are instead more likely to support legalization. Ideological self-selection into
di®erent news programs plays an important role, but cannot entirely explain the
correlation between media exposure and attitudes about illegal immigration.
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1\The U.S. media have hindered e®ective policy making on immigration for decades,
and their impact has been increasing in recent years..." Akdenizli, Dionne, Kaplan, Rosen-
stiel, and Suro (2008)
1 Introduction
Immigration is one of the most salient policy issues in the United States. Gallup polls
conducted in May 2006 and May 2007 show that immigration was considered the sec-
ond most important problem facing the country, with respectively 13 and 24 percent of
respondents mentioning it. As the number of undocumented immigrants has increased
(Passel 2005), much of the recent discussion has focused on illegal immigration. While a
small literature is emerging which tries to measure the costs and bene¯ts of illegal immi-
gration (Hanson 2006), little is known on the factors that in°uence individual attitudes
towards this facet of globalization. The purpose of this paper is to carry out what, to the
best of our knowledge, is the ¯rst, national{level, systematic study of the economic and
non economic determinants of public opinion on illegal immigration, and in particular on
the legalization of undocumented aliens.1
To undertake our analysis, we use the newly released Cooperative Congressional Elec-
tion Study (CCES),2 an individual-level survey conducted immediately before and after
the 2006 midterm elections. At that time, two legislative initiatives on illegal immigration
were being considered in the US Congress. The bill discussed in the House (H.R. 4437) fo-
cused on border enforcement and deportation of illegal immigrants. The Senate proposal
(S. 2611) contained instead a more complex set of initiatives. Besides calling for increased
security, it expanded the number of guest workers and, importantly, it introduced a path
to legalization for undocumented immigrants.
The CCES contains two question which are particularly suited for the purpose of our
study. The ¯rst one asks each respondent to state whether he/she would have voted for
the Senate plan. The second one, which was asked only to a subsample of the population,
directly compares the House and the Senate proposals. We use answers to these questions
to assess the views of each respondent on illegal immigration. In analyzing the drivers of
individual attitudes, we focus our attention on two main channels: the economic channel,
which works through the labor market and the welfare state, and the non economic
channel, with a particular emphasis on the role played by the media. The CCES is unique
1Several papers have in fact focused on speci¯c questions related to illegal immigration. Hood III and
Morris (2000), Newton (2000) and Tam and Cain (2001) for instance have looked at the determinants
of support for proposition 187 in California, which limited the access enjoyed by illegal immigrants to a
series of welfare state bene¯ts.
2http://web.mit.edu/polisci/portl/cces/index.html.
2for our purpose as, besides providing a wealth of information on the socio{economic
characteristics of the respondents, it also contains information on the TV evening news
program they most frequently watch (ABC World News, CBS Evening News, CNN, Fox
News, PBS The NewsHour, NBC Nightly News, MSNBC and others). To investigate the
role played by the actual content of the newscast, we have supplemented this information
with content coverage data obtained from the Dow Jones Factiva online archive.
To carry out our empirical analysis, we estimate a series of probit regressions. In
our main speci¯cation, the dependent variable is a pro-Senate plan dummy, which is
constructed from answers to the ¯rst policy question described above. Controlling for
other economic and non-economic drivers, we ¯nd that media exposure plays an impor-
tant role in shaping public opinion on illegal immigration. According to our estimates,
respondents watching Fox News are 9 percentage points more likely to oppose the lenient
Senate plan (relative to CBS viewers). This result is broadly consistent with the ¯ndings
of recent studies on the political position and the persuasive role of Fox News (Groseclose
and Milyo 2005, DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007). Perhaps surprisingly, we ¯nd that CNN
viewers entertain an attitude towards illegal immigration which is very similar to the one
displayed by Fox News viewers. This result might be explained by a `Lou Dobbs' e®ect.3
Instead, the opposite e®ect holds for PBS viewers, who are 14 percentage points more
likely, relative to CBS viewers, to support the Senate plan. It is worthwhile to notice that
ideological self-selection into di®erent news channels plays a relevant role, but does not
completely explain the correlation between media exposure and policy attitudes on illegal
immigration. In fact, when controlling for self-reported ideology and party identi¯cation,
the estimated e®ect for Fox News and PBS is signi¯cantly smaller in absolute value than
when not controlling for these variables, but still large and highly signi¯cant. In addition,
and most importantly, the estimated e®ect for CNN is larger in absolute value when con-
trolling for self-reported ideology and party identi¯cation. This means that, in the case
of CNN, the impact of the news program works in the opposite direction with respect
to self-selection and, thus, the coe±cient on CNN is if anything biased towards zero due
to self-selection. This result gives us con¯dence that our correlations are at least in part
driven by the causal impact of media exposure. In addition, we also ¯nd that the count of
stories covering migration in a given evening news program has a negative and signi¯cant
impact on the propensity to support the Senate plan: This result is also unlikely to be
driven by self-selection.
When forming their opinion about a given issue, individuals are also in°uenced by
the real world events pertaining to that issue (Behr and Iyengar 1985). Our ¯ndings are
3Lou Dobbs, the anchor and managing editor of CNN evening news (Lou Dobbs Tonight), has been
very vocal about the costs of illegal immigration and a staunch opponent of the Senate Plan.
3consistent with this framework: controlling for media coverage and other confounding
factors { e.g. the state-level fraction of legal immigrants { individuals living in states with
a larger fraction of illegal immigrants are signi¯cantly more favorable to the Senate plan.
The estimated correlation is quantitatively signi¯cant: an additional one percentage point
in the fraction of illegal immigrants is associated with a one percentage point increase in
the propensity to support the Senate plan.
Turning to economic drivers, we ¯nd that individuals are more favorable to the Sen-
ate's `more lenient' plan if they are more educated and richer. To better interpret these
results, we also run the same regressions using { as the dependent variable { the dummy
constructed from answers to the second policy question, which explicitly asks respondents
to compare the Senate and the House plan. Our results in the two sets of speci¯cations
are very similar. This suggests that { when answering the question about the Senate plan
{ respondents have in mind the House Plan as the alternative.
Our ¯nding that more educated individuals are more favorable to the Senate plan is
in line with the existing literature on the drivers of attitudes towards overall migration.
Compared to the House plan, the Senate plan increases the labor market competition
faced by unskilled workers, both by being more lenient on deportations as well as by
legalizing illegal workers, thus broadening their employability across sectors. Since ille-
gal immigrants are mostly unskilled, both these e®ects increase the relative supply of
unskilled labor.4 The positive impact of individual skill is then consistent with the exis-
tence of labor market complementarities, which have been shown to be important drivers
of attitudes by Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Mayda (2006) and O'Rourke and Sinnott
(2006).5
We also ¯nd that the welfare state plays an important role in shaping attitudes towards
legalization. In particular, richer individuals are more likely to support the Senate plan.
A plausible explanation of this result is that both poor and rich individuals feel penalized
by the Senate plan through the welfare state channel { since they perceive legalization
as worsening the position of public ¯nances. However, the poor are more a®ected than
the rich, because they expect bene¯ts to fall, either in quantity or quality, and they use
public services relatively more.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we review the
related literature, while in section 3 we provide some background information about
illegal immigration in the United States and the two legislative proposals discussed by
the U.S. Congress during 2006. In section 4 we describe the data. Results of our statistical
4For direct evidence on the e®ects of legalization on undocumented immigrants job perspectives, see
Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) and Orrenius and Zavodny (2007).
5See Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) and Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) for an alternative inter-
pretation of the empirical evidence on the impact of skill.
4analysis are discussed in section 5, while section 6 is devoted to a series of robustness
checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper is related to two strands of the literature. The ¯rst set of papers looks at
the impact of the media on individual preferences. The second set considers instead the
drivers of individual attitudes towards (overall) immigration.
A vast body of literature, both in economics and political science, has analyzed the
impact of the media on policy preferences, but not speci¯cally on migration preferences.
In particular, several studies have focused on the persuasion role that the mass media can
play through their \agenda-setting power", according to which the amount of coverage
devoted to a particular issue can in°uence the importance readers and viewers attach to
it (McCombs and Shaw 1972). In addition, as noted by McCombs (2002), the media not
only can make an issue more salient by increasing the amount of coverage, but it can also
emphasize particular attributes of the issue. The theory of issue priming describes how
readers and viewers, when assessing a given situation or individual, are pushed towards
giving a higher weight to the aspect emphasized by the mass media.6
Recent analyses { taking as given and known the ideological position of a media outlet
{ have tried to quantify these e®ects by exploiting experimental or quasi-experimental
settings on the degree to which individuals are exposed to a given outlet.7 DellaVigna
and Kaplan (2007) ¯nd that the gradual introduction of Fox News in cable markets has
increased the Republican vote share in presidential elections between 1996 and 2000.
Using an experimental setting, Gerber et al. (2008) have instead found no signi¯cantly
di®erent e®ect of the exposure to the Washington Times vs. the Washington Post on the
Democratic vote in the 2005 Virginia gubernatorial elections. Our data does not allow
us to exploit an experimental or quasi-experimental setting, but our analysis strongly
suggests that self selection into news programs is not the only driver of the correlations
we ¯nd between media exposure and attitudes towards illegal immigrants.
What other factors { besides media exposure { shape individual preferences towards
immigrants? A large number of recent contributions analyzes public opinion towards
overall migration and focuses on the role played by economic drivers, in particular by the
labor market channel. The analysis in these papers is typically based on a simple model
without factor price insensitivity, where unskilled (skilled) migrants compete directly
6See Krosnick and Miller (1996) for a review of this literature.
7From this point of view, these contributions build on the empirical literature which aims at measuring
the ideological position of media outlets. See e.g. Groseclose and Milyo (2005), Puglisi (2006), Lott and
Hassett (2004), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2009), Larcinese et al. (2007) and Puglisi and Snyder (2008).
5with unskilled (skilled) natives for job opportunities, while skilled (unskilled) natives
bene¯t through a labor market complementarity e®ect. Empirical analyses for the United
States (Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Kessler 2001) ¯nd that more educated individuals are
more likely to be pro-immigration, a result which is consistent with the evidence that
immigrants to the United States are on average less skilled than natives. Similarly,
extending the analysis to a multi-country framework, Mayda (2006) and O'Rourke and
Sinnott (2006) ¯nd that the sign of country-speci¯c correlations { between individual
skill and attitudes { depends on the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants
in each country. In particular, consistent with the labor-market predictions of economic
models, the data shows evidence of a positive correlation between individual skill and
pro-migration attitudes in countries that receive unskilled migrants on average, and of a
negative correlation for countries that receive skilled migrants on average.8
A second important economic factor driving attitudes is the size and type of adjust-
ment of the welfare state. In the presence of a redistributive welfare state, immigration
can have a sizeable impact on the post-tax income of natives, since it a®ects the amount
of bene¯ts they receive and the tax bill they pay. The net e®ect for a given individual de-
pends on the relative position of the individual in the ex ante income distribution, on the
relative skill-mix of natives as compared to immigrants and on the mechanism through
which the welfare state adjusts to the presence of immigrants. Empirically, Hanson et al.
(2007), Facchini and Mayda (2009) and Dustmann and Preston (2007) all ¯nd strong
evidence of the importance of this channel { for public opinion on overall immigration
{ using variation in the extent of redistribution carried out across US states as well as
across advanced Western economies.
Immigration attitudes are also in°uenced by cultural factors. As pointed out by Dust-
mann and Preston (2007), `di®erences' between the immigrant and the native populations
might induce a more negative appraisal of the immigration phenomenon, to the extent
that natives fear a dilution of nation-speci¯c characteristics and/or have a preference for
cultural (and ethnic) homogeneity. The results for Great Britain obtained by Dustmann
and Preston (2007) suggest in fact that racist feelings have a particularly strong e®ect on
attitudes towards overall migration.
Summing up, a substantial literature has investigated the drivers of public opinion on
overall immigration. At the same time, little is known on what shapes attitudes towards
illegal immigration, even though this phenomenon is at the forefront of the political
8Using the 1992 and 1994 ANES surveys, Citrin et al. (1997) shows that the statistical signi¯cance
of labor market factors in explaining individual migration attitudes is not robust to the inclusion of
other attitudinal factors as regressors. However, these attitudinal regressors (e.g., the individual opinion
about whether Hispanic and Asian immigrants might \take away jobs from people already here") can be
considered as intermediate outcomes with respect to labor market treatment and, as a result, it is not
surprising that the latter loses statistical signi¯cance when the former are included in the speci¯cation.
6debate. The purpose of this paper is to ¯ll this gap.
3 Illegal immigration in the United States
Illegal immigration refers to labor movements across national borders taking place in
a way that violates the immigration laws of the destination country. There are many
possible avenues through which an individual might become an illegal immigrant. Cit-
izens from nations which do not have automatic visa waiver agreements, or who would
not qualify otherwise for a visa, often enter a destination country by crossing the border
without inspection (illegally). Individuals might also become illegal immigrants by simply
overstaying the period of legal permanence in the country. Similarly, unauthorized im-
migrants who have applied for asylum or Temporary Protected Status are considered to
be unauthorized residents. Finally, a third possible channel is represented by fraudulent
marriages, through which a foreign citizen marries a national of the destination country,
with the only purpose of obtaining a residence permit.
Assessing the number of illegal immigrants residing in the United States involves some
educated guessing. It is well known that illegal aliens do respond to government surveys
such as the Current Population Survey or the decennial Census. While the CPS and
Census do not ask explicitly whether the foreign born is legally or illegally present in
the country, a wide range of research institutes and the O±ce of Immigration Statistics
(OIS) within the Department of Homeland Security have constructed estimates of the
number of illegal immigrants, for example based on the socio{economic characteristics
available in the CPS or Census data. The most common method to estimate the number
of illegal immigrants is to take the di®erence between the measured immigrant population
and the sum of past legal immigration °ows. Estimates obtained using this methodology
vary substantially9 but, as of January 2006, the OIS reports that there were 11.6 million
unauthorized immigrants in the United States. Of these, 4.2 millions had entered in 2000
or later, and close to sixty percent of the total number of illegal immigrants was from
Mexico.
The number of illegals has been steadily increasing from the early nineties until to-
day. Many estimates suggest that, between 1995 and 2005, the in°ows of unauthorized
migrants { at over seven hundred thousand per year { have actually been larger than
those of legal arrivals (Passel 2005). Importantly, the distribution of illegals is highly
concentrated. According to the OIS estimates, the ten states which were the largest re-
ceipients of undocumented immigrants accounted for approximately three quarters of the
total, and California and Texas alone had more than four million illegal aliens in 2006.
9See Hanson (2006) for more details.
7This is not surprising, as the two states share a border with Mexico and, at least since
1990, the vast majority of immigrants from that country are illegally living in the United
States (Passel 2005).
To understand the impact of illegal immigrants on domestic residents, it is important
to analyze the socio{economic characteristics of these individuals. Recent estimates by
the Pew Hispanic Center (Passel 2005) suggest that the following stylized facts hold: 1)
Unauthorized immigrants are younger than both natives and legal immigrants; 2) they are
substantially less educated than both natives and legal immigrants; 3) they work in lower
wage occupations, and they earn substantially less than natives and legal migrants in the
same occupations; 4) they are concentrated in a relatively small number of industries;10
5) Poverty rates among illegals are particularly high; 6) Well over ¯fty percent of illegal
immigrants do not have health insurance.
These stylized facts suggest that attitudes towards illegals will be shaped by labor
market considerations and also { even more so than for legals { by the working of the
welfare state. Since illegals are often perceived as not paying their fair share into the
government's co®ers, their participation in the welfare state has been the subject of a
heated debate in the public arena. In 1994, California voters supported by a wide margin
the introduction of Proposition 187 { also known as the \Save our State initiative" { which
was directed at excluding illegal immigrants from access to a large set of welfare programs,
including public education for their children. The proposition was later overturned and
rescinded by a federal court, but similar initiatives have been proposed in Illinois, Florida,
New York and Texas. Illegal immigrants' access to the welfare state has also been reduced
by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
of 1996, in particular by excluding them from federal child care and federal low{income
heating assistance (Zimmermann and Tumlin 1999). The question of illegal immigrants'
access to the welfare state still continues to be at the center stage of the political debate.
There have been several calls for draconian interventions. As representative Ron Paul (R,
Texas) has suggested in 2005: \We must end welfare state subsidies for illegal immigrants.
Some illegal immigrants | certainly not all | receive housing subsidies, food stamps, free
medical care, and other forms of welfare. This alienates taxpayers and breeds suspicion
of immigrants, even though the majority of them work very hard." Besides anecdotal
evidence, very little systematic information exists on the actual contributions and bene¯ts
made and received, respectively, by illegal immigrants: In the few existing studies, it has
been documented that a substantial share of illegals are employed \o® the books"11 { and
10For instance, 26% of the workers in landscaping services and 20% of those in meat/poultry packing
are unauthorized. According to Passel (2005), in ten industries illegal immigrants represent more than
ten percent of the overall labor force.
11See North and Houstoun (1976) and Passel and Clark (1997). In particular, in their study of New
8therefore are less likely to pay taxes { and that illegals are likely to be net bene¯ciaries of
the welfare state. In addition, and most importantly for this paper, little is known on the
¯scal e®ects { relative to the status quo { of the introduction of a legalization measure.12
As a response to the rapid increase in the number of illegal immigrants in the last
10 years, two important pieces of legislation have been introduced on the Congress °oor
between 2005 and 2006. \The Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration
Control Act" of 2005 (H.R. 4437, i.e. what we labeled the House plan in the introduction)
was presented on June 12, 2005 by the Wisconsin Republican Congressman Jim Sensen-
brenner. The legislation was passed by the United States House of Representatives on
December 16, 2005 by a vote of 239 to 182 (with 92% of Republicans supporting it, 82%
of Democrats opposing it), but it did not pass the Senate. Its main goal was to reduce
illegal immigration °ows, by introducing a series of measures ranging from the construc-
tion of 700 miles of reinforced fencing along the U.S. Mexico border to making it a crime
to live in the United States illegally. The proposal was the catalyst of many immigrant
rights protests, which culminated on April 10, 2006, when demonstrations against the
bill and its provisions were carried out in 102 American cities.
The second bill, \The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act" (CIRA, S. 2611, i.e.
what we label the Senate plan in the introduction) was instead a United States Senate bill
introduced by Democrat Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania on April 7, 2006. This
bill took a more comprehensive approach to immigration reform, and can be considered
a compromise attempt after the failed introduction of the so called \Kennedy{McCain"
proposal of 2005 (S. 1033). Its main goal was also to increase security along the United
States southern border with Mexico, but it contained important additional provisions. In
particular, it called for an expansion of the number of guest workers over and above those
already present in the U.S., through a new \blue card" visa program, and for allowing
long-time illegal immigrants to gain legal status. This would have been the second major
legalization initiative in twenty years, after the one included in the 1986 \Immigration
Reform and Control Act". The bill was passed by the Senate on May 25, 2006, by a vote
of 62-36. More details on both measures are reported in Table 1.
While neither bill became law because they failed to pass the conference committee,
they have been important catalysts for the immigration debate of this period. Thus,
York state, Passel and Clark (1997) assume a 60% compliance rate but, as agriculture is much less
important in New York than in the other major illegal migrants' destinations, this assumption is likely
to be substantially upward biased.
12For one of the few studies on this matter, see Camarota (2005). While there is little doubt that
legalization will lead to an increase in tax payments by the migrants { relative to the status quo { an
important question is whether legalization will lead to a big increase in welfare program participation
rates and on which agency the burden of ¯nancing the additional cost will fall (i.e. the state or the
federal government).
9understanding the drivers of individual views on these measures will provide us with
valuable information on how illegal immigration is perceived.
4 The data
The Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) is a strati¯ed cross-sectional sur-
vey, conducted around the 2006 midterm elections by Polimetrix. A crucial feature of
the CCES project is that interviews are conducted on-line, rather than on the phone or
live, and great attention has been paid to insure that the sample is representative.13 The
CCES data originates from the joint e®ort of researchers in thirty U.S. universities. As
a cooperative project, it is characterized by a modular structure, i.e. some questions are
asked to the entire set of 36;421 respondents (the so called Common Content), while other
questions (the Team Content) are speci¯c to subsets of respondents and are \purchased"
by individual research groups in the project.14
The main dependent variable in our empirical analysis is the answer to a question
about whether the respondent is in favor of the Senate plan, which o®ered a path to
legalization and citizenship to illegal immigrants. The exact wording is as follows: \An-
other issue is illegal immigration. One plan considered by the Senate would o®er illegal
immigrants who already live in the U.S. more opportunities to become legal citizens.
Some politicians argue that people who have worked hard in jobs that the economy de-
pends on should be o®ered the chance to live here legally. Other politicians argue that the
plan is an amnesty that rewards people who have broken the law. What do you think?
If you were faced with this decision, would you vote for or against this proposal?" We
create a pro lenient plan dummy variable which equals one if the respondent answers he
would have voted for the Senate proposal, and zero if he/she would have turned it down.
We exclude from the analysis those who have answered `Don't know'.
There is an additional question in the CCES regarding the respondent's likely vote on
alternative illegal immigration proposals. In this case, the respondent is asked to give his
comparative opinion about the Senate and the House plans. The exact wording of the
question is as follows: \Congress has been debating di®erent policies concerning immi-
gration reform. The Senate proposal has a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants. The
House proposal, on the other hand, contains stricter enforcement and deportation of un-
documented aliens. Which of these two items of reform do you think is more important?"
We create a pro lenient plan2 dummy variable which equals one if the respondent an-
swers he would have voted for the Senate proposal, and zero if he/she would have voted
13For methodological details, see http://web.mit.edu/polisci/portl/cces/sampledesign.html.
14In other words, each research group could buy from Polimetrix a module of at least one thousand
respondents and was allowed to ask speci¯c questions to its module, on top of the Common Content.
10for the House plan. We therefore exclude from the analysis those who have answered
`Don't know'. Since this question was asked to a subsample of 16;231 respondents (i.e.,
not to the entire sample, but only to those who were interviewed in the pilot study, held
in August 2006), we rely on this question solely for robustness checks of the main results.
Regarding media exposure, respondents are ¯rst asked to state the frequency with
which they watched a national evening news program in the week before the interview.
For those who watched a news program at least once, there is an additional question,
which asks them to mention the most frequently watched network for national evening
news.15 We create separate dummies for each most frequently watched network and an
additional dummy for those who did not watch a national evening news program (the
no evening news dummy).
The CCES survey also contains information on the age, gender, education, household
income, employment status, immigration status and political views of respondents. Edu-
cation is coded according to a 1¡6 ordered scale, with a value of one for those who have
not completed high school, and six for those with a post-graduate degree. Individuals are
asked to classify their own income along a discrete scale of 14 income \brackets", with
interval size increasing from $5;000 to $30;000.16 Previous research (Scheve and Slaugh-
ter 2001, Mayda 2006) shows that the correlation between education and immigration
attitudes is a function of labor force participation. Building on a question on employ-
ment status, we thus construct a dummy variable which equals one when the respondent
belongs to the labor force, i.e. he/she is working full time or part time or is unemployed,
and zero otherwise.
Another question in the CCES survey provides information on the immigration status
of the respondent. We use it for two di®erent purposes: ¯rst, we exclude from the
statistical analysis those who declare to be immigrants; second, for those who are U.S.
citizens and hence are included in our analysis, we use the question in order to extract
some information on the family origin of the respondent. More speci¯cally, we create a
discrete variable (immigrant origin) on a 1-3 ordered scale, with a value of 1 for those
whose parents and grandparents are U.S. citizens, a value of 2 for those whose parents
are U.S. citizens, but at least one grandparent is an immigrant, and a value of 3 for those
who declare that at least one of their parents is foreign-born.
Regarding political controls, the CCES survey has a question on self-reported ideology:
individuals are asked to locate themselves on an ideological 0 ¡ 100 scale, ranging from
zero for extremely liberal views to 100 for extremely conservative ones. Moreover, there
15The exact wording is: \Which network do you watch most frequently for national evening news?"
16There is an additional category for those who decline to answer. We exclude them from the analysis,
since it is unclear whether they are drawn disproportionately from the highest or the lowest income
bracket.
11are two variables measuring the party identi¯cation of the respondent. The ¯rst variable
is a 3-point scale party id variable, which equals minus one for self-identi¯ed Democrats,
zero for Independents and one for Republicans. The second variable is a 7-point scale
indicator, ranging from 1 for strong Democrats to 7 for strong Republicans.
One might consider religion as an organized system of beliefs which could be sys-
tematically correlated with attitudes regarding policy issues. Among others, the CCES
survey contains a question about the religious preferences of the respondent, and one
about the frequency of church attendance. We recode the church attendance variable as
an ordinal one, which ranges from a value of zero for those who declare to go to church
\never or almost never" to a value of 3 for those who (declare to) go at least once a week
or more. Moreover, the survey also includes a question on the perceived importance of
religion in everyday life. In section 6, we explore whether our baseline results are robust
to controlling for the religious attitudes of respondents.
Whether the respondent lives in an urban, suburban or rural area might be correlated
with the type and frequency of encounters with illegal immigrants and hence with his/her
views on the issue. Also, it can be correlated with other unobserved features of his/her
political views. Since respondents are not asked about their location in terms of urban,
suburban or rural area but are asked about their county of residence, we match the
CCES data with county level information, which are taken from the ICPSR County
Characteristics File.17 In particular, for each county we calculate a measure of population
density in 2005, by dividing population in that year by land area, as expressed in square
miles. This density measure is in turn expressed in tens of thousands. The only reasonable
proxy for the rural-urban location which is directly available in the CCES survey is a
question about whether the respondent owns a pick-up truck. We use this variable in the
robustness checks section.
Other county-level and state-level features might be correlated with our dependent
variable and other explanatory variables. More speci¯cally, in the robustness checks
section, we control for the unemployment rate in 2005 and the crime rate for every 100
inhabitants in 2004, both measured at the county level. Finally, we match the CCES data
with information on the estimated fraction of illegal immigrants (over total population)
living in each state in year 2005. The estimated number of illegal immigrants by state
is calculated by the Pew Hispanic Center, while total population data is taken from the
U.S. Census Bureau. We also compute a measure of the fraction of legal immigrants
over total population in 2005. The number of legal immigrants by state is computed as
the di®erence between the number of foreign born individuals and the number of illegal
immigrants. The number of foreign born individuals is derived from the Pew Hispanic
17ICPSR Study No. 20660: see http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/20660.xml.
12Center tabulations of the Census Bureau's 2005 American Community Survey.18
Summary statistics of these variables are shown in Table 2, separately for individual,
county and state level variables. The large majority of respondents is against the Senate
Plan. Regarding the most frequently watched national evening news program, Fox News
obtains the highest ratings, with NBC and CNN ranking second and third, respectively.
Age, education, household income are positively skewed, and this is also the case for the
conservative ideology score.
At the county level, population density, the unemployment and the crime rate are
all positively skewed, and show a sizeable degree of cross-sectional variation. Regard-
ing state-level variables, the estimated fraction of illegal immigrants displays some non-
negligibile variation as well, ranging from a quarter of a percentage point for West Virginia
to around seven percentage points for California. This also applies to the fraction of le-
gal immigrants, which ranges from about a ¯fth of a percentage point for Mississippi to
almost 20 percentage points again for California.
5 Empirical Results
In this section, we empirically analyze the individual-level propensity to support the
Senate plan on illegal immigration as a function of respondents' characteristics. We run
a set of probit regressions with the pro lenient plan dummy as the dependent variable,
excluding all individuals who describe themselves as immigrants. The regression output is
displayed in Tables 3 and 5 where, for each explanatory variable, we report the marginal
e®ect. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level and are shown under
each marginal e®ect.
Notice that, in the CCES question we analyze, individuals are asked to evaluate
the Senate plan but are not mentioned any explicit alternative.19 The interpretation
of the marginal e®ects of a number of variables (in particular, education, income, etc.)
depends on which alternative voters have in mind { whether the status quo or the House
plan { as they evaluate the Senate plan. To shed light on this point, we run the same
regressions as in Tables 3 and 5 using the second question { the pro lenient plan2 dummy
variable { as the dependent variable (see Tables A1 and A2). We ¯nd that the estimates
of the marginal e®ects of most variables in Tables A1 and A2 are very similar to the
corresponding estimates in Tables 3 and 5.20 As a result, we conclude that the alternative
18See http://pewhispanic.org/reports/foreignborn/.
19On the other hand, in the second question, individuals are asked about the Senate vs. House plans.
However, we have decided not to use the second question as our main dependent variable since that
question is asked to a substantially smaller number of respondents.
20The most important di®erences are that, in the regressions using the second question, the Black
dummy variable is often negative and signi¯cant when we control for ideology; in addition, the fraction
13respondents have in mind, as they evaluate the Senate plan, is the House plan. However,
we will also discuss the interpretation of the results if, instead, respondents have in mind
the status quo as the alternative.
5.1 The impact of media exposure on individual attitudes
In Table 3 we report our baseline results. We start with a speci¯cation where we omit
ideological and political party controls (regression [1]). Next, in column [2], we introduce
the conservative ideology score and the 3-point party id variable. In regression [3], we
replace the 3-point party id variable with a 7-point one and we include the county-speci¯c
measure of population density as well as the state-speci¯c measures of exposure to illegal
and legal immigration. In columns [4] and [5] we introduce state and designated market
area (DMA) ¯xed e®ects, respectively.21 In the ¯rst ¯ve columns of Table 3 we use
dummy variables for each media channel, with CBS viewers as the omitted category.
In order to analyze the role played by media exposure { in particular in relation to
self-selection issues { it is crucial to compare the estimates with and without ideological
controls, i.e. column [1] vs. columns [2]-[5].
By themselves, political and ideological variables are very signi¯cant predictors of
policy attitudes towards illegal immigration. A one-point increase in the conservative
ideology scale (which is de¯ned on a 0-100 range) is associated with about half of a
percentage point decrease in the probability of supporting the Senate plan. By the same
token, the 3-point party id variable is negatively and signi¯cantly correlated with the
lenient plan dummy, and the same is true for the 7-point party id, which we introduce
from column [3]. When not controlling for self-reported ideology and party identi¯cation,
individuals watching Fox News are 26 percentage points less likely to support the Senate
plan { as compared to CBS viewers (the excluded category) { while this marginal e®ect
shrinks to between 9 and 10 percentage points when we do control for ideological and
partisan preferences. By the same token, PBS viewers are 23 percentage points more likely
compared to CBS viewers to support the lenient plan in column [1] and between 14 and 15
percentage points in the following columns. To the extent that conservative individuals
have a preference for Fox News and dislike the Senate plan on illegal immigration, omitting
controls for ideology and party id biases downwards the marginal e®ect of the Fox News
dummy, which ends up absorbing those self-selection e®ects.22 Along the same lines, to
of illegal immigrants at the state level does not have a signi¯cant e®ect.
21DMAs identify the di®erent TV cable markets in the U.S.; they are named after the main city (or
cities) in each area.
22This result is in fact consistent with the Groseclose and Milyo (2005) analysis of think tank quotes,
which places Fox News' Special Report with Brit Hume signi¯cantly to the right with respect to CBS
Evening News.
14the extent that liberal individuals appreciate PBS and the more lenient Senate plan, the
marginal e®ect of the PBS dummy is biased upwards when not controlling for ideology
and party id.
On the other hand, those watching CNN are about 5 percentage points less likely to
favor the Senate plan when not controlling for ideology and between 8 and 9 percentage
points less likely when doing so. Prima facie, it is perhaps surprising that those watching
CNN are systematically less likely to support the Senate plan than CBS viewers, but
this result can be explained in light of what in the introduction we have dubbed the
\Lou Dobbs e®ect".23 It is the case that Lou Dobbs, the anchor and managing editor
of CNN evening news, has always been very vocal regarding the costs imposed by illegal
immigration on the American public, and has consistently opposed the Senate bill pro-
posal. For example, his o±cial website features a speci¯c section on illegal immigration
called \Broken Borders".24 This is how he describes the issues at stake: \The single most
critical issue to protect our nation is the securing of our borders and our ports. Every
day, tens of thousands of containers enter our country from other nations and they are
never inspected. At the same time, our government turns a blind eye to the thousands of
people who illegally cross our borders. These scenarios exist because corporate America
has convinced our leaders that this is one of the best ways to remain competitive." When
the Senate passed the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, Lou Dobbs introduced
the story with the following words: \Tonight, the Senate has just voted for a so-called
comprehensive immigration reform bill. The vote, 62-36. The legislation gives amnesty
to millions of illegal aliens and sharply escalates the war on our middle class and raises
the cost of federal government substantially".25 From the point of view of ideological
self-selection, the bias towards zero of the CNN dummy variable in regression [1] { in-
duced by omitting ideological controls { suggests that CNN viewers are more liberal than
CBS viewers (the omitted category). In addition, and most importantly, the result for
CNN { that the impact of the news program works in the opposite direction with respect
to self-selection { gives us con¯dence that our correlations are at least in part driven
by the causal impact of media exposure. In other words, if anything, the coe±cient on
CNN represents a lower bound of the causal impact of CNN on attitudes towards illegal
immigrants.
It is also interesting to notice that the marginal e®ects of media exposure are remark-
ably stable once we start controlling for ideological and partisan preferences. As men-
tioned above, beginning with column [3] we replace the 3-point party id variable with the
23See also Akdenizli, Dionne, Kaplan, Rosenstiel, and Suro (2008).
24See http://loudobbs.tv.cnn.com/category/broken-borders/.
25The excerpt is taken from Lou Dobbs Tonight, May 25th 2006.
157-point one, but this does not a®ect our estimates of the media exposure variables.26
Focusing on the other media channels, individuals watching NBC, MSNBC or other
networks appear not to be signi¯cantly di®erent from CBS viewers in their propensity to
support the more lenient immigration plan, while viewers of ABC News are systematically
less likely to favor the Senate plan than CBS viewers, with an estimated marginal e®ect
between 3 and 4 percentage points. Finally, respondents declaring not to watch any
national evening news program are signi¯cantly less likely than CBS viewers to be in
favor of the Senate plan.
Overall, the evidence we have gathered is consistent with the fact that self-selection
explains a sizeable portion of the correlation between policy attitudes on illegal immigra-
tion and media exposure, but not the whole of it: persuasion, as best exempli¯ed by the
Lou Dobbs e®ect, appears to be a non-negligible factor.
How do the e®ects of media exposure relate to the ideological position of each TV
channel? In other words, is it true that more liberal channels have a more positive
impact on the probability of supporting the lenient Senate plan? If one believes that
self-selection is satisfactorily accounted for by controlling for the ideology and party id
of the respondent, then the estimated marginal e®ect of each channel dummy measures
the persuasive e®ect of that channel on attitudes towards illegal immigration. Our goal
is to relate this persuasive e®ect to the ideological position of the TV channel. While
measures of the partisan stance of media outlets are available in the literature, we can
directly exploit the self selection argument in order to build our own measure of each
TV channel's ideological position. To do so, we proceed as follows. A given TV channel
reveals itself to be more liberal than CBS if it is chosen by people who are more liberal
than the (omitted) category of CBS viewers. In turn, this is true if and only if the
marginal e®ect of that channel dummy is larger when not controlling for the ideology
and party id of the respondents, than when doing so. More formally, let the marginal
e®ect of a TV channel dummy in regression (1) be ±1 and the marginal e®ect of the same
TV channel in regression (5) be ±5. In turn, ±1 = ±5 + OV B where OV B is the omitted
variable bias arising from the omission of ideological controls. We know that
OVB / Corr(Viewer's Cons. Id., TV Channel) x Corr(Viewer's Cons. Id., Attitudes)
Since our estimates suggest that Corr(Viewer's Cons. Id., Attitudes) < 0, then if
±1 > ±5 it must be true that OV B > 0 and therefore that Corr (Viewer's Cons. Id., TV
Channel) < 0. In other words, the TV channel reveals itself to be more liberal than the
CBS benchmark, based on the preferences of viewers who choose it.
26This replacement marginally goes in the direction of increasing the point estimates of the marginal
e®ect of the Fox News dummy (i.e., reducing its absolute value), and decreasing the one on the CNN
dummy (i.e., increasing its absolute value).
16The outcome of this exercise is illustrated in Figure 1 where { for each TV channel {
we plot the estimated marginal e®ect { on the propensity to support the Senate plan {
against its overall ideological position. More precisely, the former is taken from column [5]
in Table 3, while the latter is calculated as the di®erence in the estimated marginal e®ect
of each channel dummy when moving from speci¯cation [1] to speci¯cation [5], again in
Table 3.The relationship appears to be positive, since more liberal channels like PBS are
associated with a more positive e®ect on the propensity to support the Senate plan, and
vice versa for a conservative channel like Fox News. But it is especially interesting to
focus on the relative position of CNN, which is close to CBS and NBC from the point
of view of the overall ideological position (as revealed by its viewers), but has a negative
e®ect on immigration attitudes, the size of which is comparable to that of Fox News.
In fact, when including CNN the relationship between the overall ideological position of
each TV channel and its persuasive e®ect on immigration attitudes is positive but not
statistically signi¯cant, while it is signi¯cant at the 10 percent level when excluding CNN.
One can also notice that the so called \Big Three", i.e. the oldest U.S. networks (ABC,
CBS and NBC), are closely clustered in the scatter plot, while PBS, the publicly ¯nanced
channel, displays the most liberal stance on both dimensions.
As mentioned in the introduction, the exposure to real world events is likely to a®ect
individual attitudes, or at least to be a signi¯cant predictor thereof. At the county
level, population density is positively and signi¯cantly correlated with the propensity
to support the Senate plan: column [3] in Table 3 shows that an increase of density
of 10;000 individuals per square mile is associated with a 3 percentage points increase
in the probability of being in favor of the more lenient immigration plan. This result is
consistent with the idea that living in an urban area increases the frequency of encounters
with illegal immigrants and hence positively a®ects the respondent's views on the issue.
Thus, this ¯nding is consistent with the so called \intergroup contact theory" (Allport
1954). According to this theory, as developed within the social psychology ¯eld, the
interaction itself between di®erent racial groups can reduce intergroup prejudice and
foster more friendly attitudes. Also, living in an urban area is likely to be correlated with
other unobserved features of the respondent's political views.
In column [3] we also control for the state-speci¯c fraction of illegal immigrants:
we ¯nd that respondents living in states with a higher fraction of illegal immigrants
are signi¯cantly more likely to support the more lenient Senate plan. The size of this
correlation is quite large, as a one percentage point increase in the fraction of illegals is
associated with a 0:7 percentage points increase in the propensity to support the Senate
plan. This result is again consistent with \intergroup contact theory". One might be
concerned that the partial correlation between attitudes and the state-speci¯c fraction of
17illegal immigrants is picking up some omitted variable at the state level, e.g. exposure to
legal immigrants. Thus, we also control for the state-speci¯c fraction of legal immigrants
and ¯nd that it is not signi¯cantly correlated with the dependent variable. Columns
[4]-[5] replicate the speci¯cation featured in column [3] but with the addition of state and
DMA ¯xed e®ects, respectively: the estimated marginal e®ects are remarkably robust to
this change.
In the second part of Table 3 we further investigate the estimated correlations of im-
migration attitudes with the respondent's favorite evening news broadcast. In particular,
we check whether the way each news broadcast covers illegal immigration helps explain
the previously estimated marginal e®ects on the TV channel dummies. As discussed in
section 2, both the overall amount and type of media coverage devoted to a given issue
could matter. In our case we focus on overall coverage, since it can be easily measured
in a replicable fashion. The Dow Jones Factiva online archive allows to search the tran-
scripts of evening news programs on ABC, CBS, CNN, Fox News, PBS and NBC. We
proxy the total amount of coverage to which respondents are exposed { before being
interviewed during the 2006 midterm campaign { with the broadcast-speci¯c number of
stories featuring the words \immigration" or \immigrants" between January 2006 and
October 2006. We do the same with the search terms \illegal immigration" or \illegal
immigrants", and we compute the di®erence between those two counts, in order to obtain
a measure of immigration coverage that does not mention illegal immigration.27
Table 4 reports this media coverage data for each of the six TV channels. It is
interesting to notice that Fox News and CNN devoted the largest amount of coverage to
immigration overall, while PBS and CBS devoted the least. However, when looking at
illegal immigration, PBS dedicated much less coverage than CBS, while CNN gave more
coverage than Fox.
In the second part of Table 3, for comparison purposes, we start with a baseline
speci¯cation (column [6]) which includes only the respondents mentioning the six channels
as favorite ones { thus we exclude respondents who do not watch a national evening news
program - but we do not control for media coverage variables. In column [7] we add
as regressors the channel-speci¯c count of stories mentioning illegal immigration and the
channel-speci¯c count of stories mentioning immigration but not the illegal aspect of it.
There is a very strong and negative correlation between those measures of media coverage
and the propensity to support the Senate plan. In terms of magnitudes, ten additional
illegal immigration stories during the January/October 2006 period are associated with
a one percentage point decrease in the probability of supporting the more lenient plan
27A word of caution regarding Fox News: Since the transcripts for its evening news broadcast are not
available, we instead look at the O'Reilly Factor.
18on immigration. The size of the e®ect for stories mentioning immigration but not illegal
one is the same. All other estimated marginal probabilities are practically una®ected by
this cardinal speci¯cation of the media exposure variable.
To conclude, this last result { i.e., the sizeable and signi¯cant impact of the number of
immigration-related stories on the propensity to support the Senate plan { is especially
important because it provides additional evidence that the media e®ects we are estimating
are not driven only by self-selection. As a matter of fact, while it is plausible that
individuals self-select into evening news programs based on the broad ideological position
of the channel, it is less likely that self-selection works on the basis of the count of stories
covering immigration.
5.2 Labor-market and welfare state determinants of individual
attitudes
Besides studying the role played by the media, the regressions reported in Table 3 allow
us to analyze the labor-market and welfare-state determinants of attitudes in favor of
legalization, accounting for a number of socio-demographic individual-level controls.
First, we ¯nd that the impact of age on the propensity to support the Senate plan
is characterized by a U-shaped relationship, as shown by the negative marginal e®ect
of age and the positive marginal e®ect of age squared. The estimated minimum in the
propensity to support the Senate plan occurs at an age between 55 (column [2]) and 58
(column [1]). In other words, as they approach midlife young respondents become more
opposed to the legalization plan, while older respondents become more in favor as they
move towards retirement. A plausible interpretation of the positive marginal e®ect for
elderly individuals is that illegal immigrants { who would be legalized under the Senate
plan while they would be deported under the House plan { o®er services which are mostly
consumed by the old, for example elderly care and landscaping services.
Moreover, females appear to be signi¯cantly more supportive of the Senate plan only
when not controlling for ideology (column [1]). In fact, once we control for self-reported
ideology and party id in the following regressions, we do not ¯nd evidence of a gender
e®ect on pro-legalization attitudes. This result can be easily explained by the fact that
women are on average more liberal than men so that { when not controlling for ideology
{ the ideology e®ect on illegal immigration attitudes is absorbed by the female dummy.
A similar interpretation can be given to the marginal e®ect of the Black dummy variable,
which is positive and signi¯cant in column [1] and becomes insigni¯cant in the following
regressions.
Not surprisingly, being a Latino has a positive and signi¯cant impact on pro-legalization
19attitudes, controlling or not for ideology and party id. Our estimates also show that in-
dividuals are more willing to support the Senate plan the more recent the immigration
status of their family (as captured by immigrant origin). The size of this e®ect is rel-
atively large: A one-point increase in the immigrant origin variable is associated with
approximately a 2 percentage points increase in the propensity to support the lenient
immigration plan.
Respondents are signi¯cantly more likely to support the Senate plan, the higher their
education level and their household income. Both correlations are strongly signi¯cant
throughout the table, although the magnitude of the e®ect is larger for education. The
only exception to this pattern occurs for income when not controlling for the political
ideology of the respondent: indeed, in column [1], income is negatively correlated with the
propensity to support the Senate plan while, from regression [2] on, the marginal e®ect
becomes positive and signi¯cant. The change in the sign of the e®ect is certainly due to
the omitted variable bias a®ecting the speci¯cation with no controls for the ideological
and partisan preferences of the respondent. In fact, individuals are systematically more
conservative the higher their income. Therefore, if ideology is not controlled for, the
negative correlation of the conservative ideology with the propensity to endorse the lenient
plan ends up exerting a downward bias on the marginal e®ect of income.
The positive impact of education on pro-legalization attitudes is consistent with the
labor-market competition hypothesis (Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Kessler 2001, Mayda
2006, O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006).28 In fact, it is certainly plausible to assume that the
Senate plan increases the labor market competition of unskilled natives { relative to the
House plan.29 Since undocumented migrants are mostly unskilled, the e®ect of legalizing
them, as opposed to deporting them, is to increase the relative supply of unskilled workers
in the United States.
Suppose instead that respondents are comparing the Senate plan to the status quo,
rather than to the House plan. In this case, the legalization of illegal immigrants has
two e®ects: it allows previously illegal immigrants to access occupations and industries
which were until then precluded to them; and it eliminates the \unfair labor market
competition" of illegal immigrants vis µ a vis unskilled natives { in other words, once
illegal immigrants enter the formal market, they need to be paid the minimum wage,
enjoy higher employment protection, receive unemployment bene¯ts, etc.. To the extent
28In general, the labor market competition hypothesis predicts that the level of individual skill should
be positively correlated with pro-immigration preferences in countries where immigrants increase the
labor market competition for unskilled natives (for example, when immigrants are unskilled) and nega-
tively correlated in countries where immigrants increase the labor market competition for skilled natives
(for example, when immigrants are skilled). See Figure 2.
29Remember that Tables A1 and A2 seem to suggest that, when answering the question, respondents
are comparing the Senate plan to the House plan.
20that the ¯rst e®ect more than o®sets the second one { which is plausible and consistent
with the literature30 { the Senate plan will still be perceived as increasing the labor
market competition faced by domestic unskilled workers.
In Appendix Table A3, we split the sample according to whether the respondent
belongs to the labor force or not.31 We ¯nd that the estimate of the marginal e®ect
of education is systematically larger for those who belong to the labor force than for
those who do not. This evidence con¯rms the above labor-market interpretation of the
marginal e®ect of education. In addition, the impact of education on legalization attitudes
is positive and signi¯cant for individuals out of the labor force as well. Thus, our results
are also consistent with a non economic interpretation of the e®ect of education, according
to which the education variable is to some extent capturing the cultural openness of the
respondent (see, for example, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Thus, both non economic
and labor-market considerations shape the impact of education on public opinion on the
Senate plan.
The impact of household income gives us information about the welfare state de-
terminants of pro-legalization attitudes. Theory highlights that a redistributive welfare
system might adjust to immigration through changes in the tax burden or in the generos-
ity of bene¯ts (Facchini and Mayda 2009). In both frameworks what is crucial is whether
migration improves or worsens the ¯scal stance of the welfare state: unskilled migrants
are expected to be a burden, while the opposite is true for skilled migrants. In addi-
tion, depending on which adjustment takes place, immigration will give rise to opposite
income-distribution e®ects through the welfare-state channel. If the level of per capita
bene¯ts is kept constant and changes occur on the tax side of the budget (tax adjustment
model), unskilled immigration has a larger negative impact on individuals at the top of
the income distribution. The reason is that increases in the tax rate mostly a®ect rich
individuals, whose tax payments represent a larger fraction of their net income. Similarly,
skilled immigration has a larger positive impact on rich individuals.32 On the other hand,
if tax rates remain constant and the adjustment takes place on the bene¯t side (bene¯t
adjustment model), the income-distribution e®ects of migration are completely reversed.
Low-income individuals are more negatively a®ected if migration is unskilled and more
positively a®ected if migration is skilled. The reason is that per capita bene¯ts represent
a larger fraction of a poor individual's net income.33
30See Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) and Orrenius and Zavodny (2007).
31It is worthwhile to notice that students are excluded from both subsamples.
32Thus, in the tax adjustment model, individual income is negatively correlated with pro-immigration
preferences in countries where immigrants represent a net burden (for example, when immigrants are
unskilled) and positively correlated otherwise (for example, when immigrants are skilled). See Figure 3.
33Thus, in the bene¯t adjustment model, individual income is positively correlated with pro-immigration
preferences in countries where immigrants represent a net burden (for example, when immigrants are
21If respondents are comparing the Senate plan to the House plan - as Tables A1 and
A2 seem to suggest { they will necessarily perceive legalization as worsening the ¯scal
position of the welfare state. The reason is that illegal immigrants are unskilled, there-
fore legalizing them as opposed to deporting them will worsen the government's budget.
Therefore, the positive impact of household income in Table 3 is consistent with the
bene¯t adjustment model: Both poor and rich individuals feel penalized by the Senate
plan through the welfare state channel { since they perceive legalization as worsening the
position of public ¯nances { but the poor more so than the rich, because they use public
services relatively more (see right panel of Figure 4).
This result { in favor of the bene¯t adjustment model { is not consistent with the
existing evidence on attitudes towards overall immigration (Hanson et al. 2007, Han-
son 2005, Facchini and Mayda 2009). Thus, it appears that respondents have di®erent
perceptions of the adjustment of the welfare state in reaction to legal vs. illegal immi-
gration. One possible explanation is that, in the case of legal migration, authorities do
take into account the higher number of participants in the welfare state (i.e. migrants)
and, therefore, adjust the welfare system accordingly. On the other hand, in the case
of illegal migration, it is likely that there is no (quantitative) adjustment of the welfare
state, i.e. the increase in the number of participants is simply ignored. Although more
people now access the welfare system, tax rates do not change nor bene¯ts { for example,
schools, hospitals, etc. { vary in number. However, the quality of bene¯ts changes, due to
overcrowding brought about by the arrival of illegal immigrants. Since the poor are larger
bene¯ciaries of welfare bene¯ts, they are hurt the most by illegal immigrants through the
welfare state channel.
On the other hand we could assume that, in assessing the Senate plan, respondents
have in mind the status quo as the alternative. As pointed out above, the positive
impact of household income is consistent with the tax (bene¯t) adjustment model as long
as legalization is perceived to reduce (increase) the burden of migration on the welfare
state (see left (right) panel of Figure 3 (Figure 4)). Most existing estimates suggest
that only a fraction of illegal immigrants pay taxes (see Camarota 2005): this issue
has been repeatedly highlighted in the public debate. Legalization will imply that tax
compliance by legalized illegal immigrants will increase and this will substantially raise
the government's tax revenues.34 However, it is not clear ex-ante whether the increase
in tax revenues - brought about by legalization { will more than o®set the increase in
public services used by legalized illegal immigrants. Therefore, on net, legalization might
unskilled) and negatively correlated otherwise (for example, when immigrants are skilled). See Figure 4.
34One must also take into account that, relative to the status quo, the Senate plan's proposed le-
galization is likely to shift the burden of ¯nancing some of the welfare programs from state to federal
government, thus reducing the ¯scal burden xxx felt by each respondent.
22either reduce or increase the burden of migration on public ¯nances, relative to the status
quo. This implies that, if respondents have in mind the status quo as the alternative,
our estimates could be consistent with both the tax adjustment model and the bene¯t
adjustment model.
6 Robustness checks
In this section we perform a series of robustness checks of our baseline results. The
CCES survey contains a host of questions that allow us to further investigate the lifestyle
and ideological position of the respondent. Moreover, by matching the CCES data with
county-level information, we can better control for the politically relevant features of the
local environment where the respondent lives. Results of our robustness checks are shown
in Table 5.
In column [1] of Table 5, we include the same variables as in column [3] of Table 3
plus a control for whether the respondent owns a pick-up truck: as discussed in section
4, this variable might simultaneously capture whether the individual does not live in a
city and something about his lifestyle. We ¯nd that owning a pick up truck is associated
with a 5:5 percentage points reduction in the probability to support the Senate plan.
As thoroughly discussed by Guiso et al. (2003), individual attitudes might be system-
atically correlated with the type and intensity of religious beliefs being held. Regarding
the speci¯c topic of immigration, Guiso et al. (2003) show that individuals interviewed
within the World Values Survey (WVS) are signi¯cantly more intolerant towards immi-
grants if they were raised religiously and they declare to be currently religious, while
being actively religious is not signi¯cantly correlated with immigration attitudes. More-
over, Guiso et al. (2003) show that Catholics, Protestants and Muslims are more likely
to be intolerant towards immigrants than agnostic individuals, while Buddhists display
the opposite tendency.
In columns [2] and [3] of Table 5 we exploit the CCES questions tapping into the
religious beliefs and habits of respondents. More speci¯cally, we include dummy variables
for the respondent declaring to be Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, of another
religion or of another Christian religion, keeping as the omitted category those who
declare not to have any religious preference. We also control for each individual's church
attendance frequency and for the importance he/she attaches to religion in everyday
life. Self-declared Protestants and Catholics are around 6 percentage points less likely
to support the Senate plan on illegal immigration, as compared to individuals with no
religious preference. The correlation is of the same sign and larger in magnitude (around
8 percentage points) for those who declare to belong to another Christian religion. The
23level of signi¯cance is one percent for all three marginal e®ects. On the other hand,
the propensity to favor the more lenient plan on illegal immigration is signi¯cantly and
positively correlated with church attendance.35 Finally, the religion importance dummy
is not signi¯cantly correlated with the respondent's opinion on the illegal immigration
plan.
From this point of view, our results are reasonably in line with those obtained by
Guiso et al.: we similarly ¯nd that immigration attitudes are signi¯cantly more negative
for Catholics and Protestants, however we ¯nd no signi¯cant e®ect for Muslims. This
could be due to the lower number of Muslims in the U.S., as compared to the cross-country
WVS sample. Moreover, di®erently from Guiso et al., we ¯nd that church attendance has
a mitigating e®ect on negative immigration attitudes. Of course one should handle this
comparison with some further caution, since (i) as mentioned above, our sample is a U.S.
one, (ii) we are concerned with illegal immigration, rather than with the immigration
phenomenon as a whole, and (iii) we use as the dependent variable a policy-related
question, instead of a direct question about attitudes.
An additional concern regarding our results is the possibility that they are partially
driven by omitted variables at the state or county level. In Table 3 we have already
shown that our ¯ndings on individual-level variables are robust to the inclusion of state
and DMA ¯xed e®ects as well as to controlling for population density at the county level.
In column [3] of Table 5 we further control for the county-speci¯c 2004 crime rate and
2005 unemployment rate: the rationale for this is that individuals might be particularly
sensitive to their economic and social environment when they are asked to think about a
policy proposal regarding a potentially very contentious issue.
We ¯nd a positive, statistically signi¯cant and quantitatively non negligible correla-
tion between the county-level crime rate and the propensity to support the Senate plan:
a one percentage point increase in the crime rate (i.e., an additional crime event for every
100 inhabitants) is associated with about a one percentage point increase in the proba-
bility of favoring the more lenient plan on immigration. Conditionally on all the caveats
regarding the distinction between causation and correlation, this result is consistent with
the hypothesis that individuals on average believe that the illegal status of immigrants is
conducive to a higher propensity to criminal behavior, and that legalization might help
break this vicious link. On the other hand, we ¯nd no signi¯cant impact of the unemploy-
ment rate. It is also worthwhile to notice that, in columns [1] and [2], there is a mildly
signi¯cant and negative relationship between the propensity to support the Senate plan
35When distinguishing according to the religious faith of the respondent, further results { available
upon request { show that the church attendance variable is statistically signi¯cant only for Protestants,
Catholics and individuals belonging to another Christian obedience.
24and the state-speci¯c fraction of legal immigrants.36 It is still the case that the fraction
of illegal immigrants is positively and signi¯cantly correlated with the pro lenient plan
dummy, mildly so in column [3].
In the second part of Table 5 (columns [4], [5] and [6]) we replicate the format of the
¯rst part, but use the cardinal measure of immigration coverage (as already explored in
the second part of Table 3). When doing so, we do not ¯nd signi¯cant departures from
the results in Table 3 and { regarding the robustness checks themselves { from the those
displayed in the ¯rst part of Table 5.
7 Discussion and conclusions
Illegal immigration is at the center of the national debate in the majority of destina-
tion countries of immigrant °ows. Several factors in°uence voters' views regarding this
phenomenon, ranging from economic to cultural ones. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper represents the ¯rst systematic empirical analysis of the determinants of public
opinion on illegal immigration, and in particular on the legalization of undocumented
aliens. Our main results suggest that respondents are more favorable to the more-lenient
Senate plan on illegal immigration if they are more educated, more liberal and richer.
Individuals watching Fox News or CNN are much more likely to be against the Senate
plan than those who watch CBS, while PBS viewers are characterized by the opposite
e®ect. Finally, individuals living in states with larger fractions of illegal immigrants are
more favorable to the legalization of illegal immigrants.
Concerning the role of economic drivers of immigration attitudes, our analysis suggests
that both labor market and welfare state drivers play an important role. We ¯nd that
more skilled individuals are more likely to support the Senate plan, a result which is in
line with the labor market complementarity hypothesis. Furthermore, we show that richer
individuals are more likely to support the Senate plan. Under the reasonable hypothesis
that respondents have in mind the House plan as the alternative to the Senate plan, our
results are consistent with the bene¯t adjustment model. As discussed in section 5.2, a
likely explanation for this result is that, in the case of illegal migration, there is little or
no quantitative adjustment of the welfare state. As a consequence of this, the quality
of bene¯ts drops because of overcrowding e®ects, which particularly hurt the poor, since
they are larger bene¯ciaries of such services. Future research should shed light on which
adjustment takes place in reality, beyond individuals' perceptions, both in the case of
legal and illegal immigration.
We conclude the paper by re-emphasizing a crucial issue in the empirical analysis.
36The relationship is no longer signi¯cant in column [3].
25While we have controlled for a number of potential omitted variable biases, we cannot
claim we estimated a causal e®ect of media exposure on public opinion on illegal immi-
grants. In other words, to the extent that we do not have a clean natural experiment,
although very suggestive, our estimates must be interpreted with due caution. As repeat-
edly pointed out, the crucial confounding factor is self-selection: individuals likely choose
to expose themselves to the media outlet whose ideological position is closest to theirs.
In fact, when not controlling for self-reported ideology and party id, the estimated par-
tial correlation between illegal immigration attitudes and the Fox News dummy is much
larger in absolute value than when we add those controls. The same is true for the PBS
dummy, albeit with the opposite sign. On the other hand, consistently with the fact that
Lou Dobbs entertains a very negative (and in°uential) position about illegal immigra-
tion on a TV channel which is overall left leaning, the estimated marginal e®ect of CNN
viewership is negative but smaller in absolute value when not controlling for ideological
factors at the individual level. This last result gives us con¯dence that our ¯ndings are
not driven uniquely by self-selection, but rather that our correlations are at least in part
driven by the causal impact of media exposure. In addition, we also ¯nd that the count of
stories covering migration in a given evening news program has a negative and signi¯cant
impact on the propensity to support the Senate plan: This result is unlikely to be driven
by self-selection.
The exact reason why readers and viewers might self-select themselves to ideologi-
cally consonant media outlets in turn depends on whether they consume news in order to
acquire information (Calvert 1985 and Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006), or to con¯rm their
prior beliefs (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005). One important direction of future re-
search is to look for sources of exogenous variation in respondents' viewership of di®erent
channels to better disentangle and quantify those two competing hypotheses, i.e. the in-
°uence hypothesis, according to which the media has a causal impact on voters' attitudes,
and the self-selection one, according to which individuals choose speci¯c newspapers and
media channels as a function of their ex{ante preferences.
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Fig. 1: Estimated ideological position of each TV channel and effect on illegal immigration attitudes
Notes:  the graph displays the estimated marginal effect on the propensity to support the Senate plan for each TV channel against its overall ideological 
position. The former is taken from column [5] in Table 3. The latter is a measure of liberal ideology and is calculated as the difference in the estimated 
marginal effect of each channel dummy when moving from specification [1] to specification [5], i.e. when including ideological and party id controls. See 
section 5.1 for additional details.Legalization of illegal immigrants increases the labor 
market competition for unskilled natives











Notes: the graph shows the relationship between the respondent’s education and the sensitivity of his/her net income to migration 





represents the percentage change in individual income for a marginal change in π, the ratio of immigrants to natives.
Legalization of illegal immigrants decreases the labor 









Notes: the graph shows the relationship between the respondent’s gross income and the sensitivity of his/her net income to migration 
according to the tax adjustment model, as a function of whether legalization of illegal immigrants represents a net contributiono r  a  n e t  
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Notes: the graph shows the relationship between the respondent’s gross income and the sensitivity of his/her net income to migration 
according to the benefit adjustment model, as a function of whether legalization of illegal immigrants represents a net contribution or a 





represents the percentage change in individual income for a marginal change in π, the ratio of immigrants to natives.
Legalization of illegal migrants represents a net contribution 
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Would give illegal immigrants who have lived in the United States for
two years or more a path to eventual citizenship. Illegal immigrants
who have been here less than two years would be required to leave the
country altogether. They could apply for the guest worker program,
but they would not be guaranteed acceptance in it.
No provisions for legalization, although a conservative leader in the
House, Representative Mike Pence, proposed a separate bill that
would allow illegal immigrants to become guest workers, but not
permanent residents or citizens.
Temporary Worker 
Program
Creates a guest worker program with a path to legal permanent
residence.
In December, the House defied President Bush's call for a guest
worker program although the separate bill recently introduced by
Mike Pence, the leader of the conservative caucus in the House,
would allow illegal immigrants to become guest workers.
Number of Guest 
Workers to be 
Admitted Annually 
Negotiations in the Senate bill have reduced the number of foreign
guest workers to be admitted annually to 200,000 a year from
320,000.
No such provisions in the House bill.
Worksite Enforcement The legislation would require employers to use an electronic
employment verification system that would distinguish between legal
and illegal workers.
Requires employers to participate in an electronic employment
eligibility verification system within three to six years.
Criminal Penalties for 
Existing Illegal 
Immigrants 
Mandates penalties for smuggling aliens, but offers exceptions for
those who provide "humanitarian" assistance to immigrants,
including medical care and housing. Also, illegal immigrants
convicted of a felony or three misdemeanors would be deported.
Makes it a federal crime to live in the United States illegally.
Individuals who help illegal immigrants to enter or stay in the country
would also face criminal penalties.
Table 1- Details about the bills passed by the Senate and the House (source: New York Times)
Border Security: 
Fencing
The bill initially called for limited "double- or triple-layered fencing"
but as the debate progressed, the Senate added provisions for 350
miles of border fencing and 500 miles of vehicle barriers between the
United States and Mexico.
Requires the construction of "at least two layers of reinforced
fencing" as well as "physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras and
sensors" along approximately 700 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border.
Border Security: 
Personnel
Increases the number of Border Patrol agents by 2,400 each year
through 2011 to the current force of 11,300 agents.
Hires more Border Patrol agents "as expeditiously as possible."
Nearly 12,000 Border Patrol agents currently stand guard. Hires at
least 250 active duty port of entry inspectors for each of the next three
years.Table 2: summary statistics
Variable No of obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Individual level
Pro_lenient_plan dummy 24546 0.385 0 0.487 0 1
Pro_lenient_plan2 dummy 11050 0.289 0 0.454 0 1
Age 24546 48.773 49 14.886 18 93
Female dummy 24546 0.485 0 0.500 0 1
Black dummy 24546 0.097 0 0.297 0 1
Latino dummy 24546 0.081 0 0.273 0 1
Immigrant origin 24546 1.425 1 0.645 1 3
Education 24546 3.338 3 1.366 1 6
Household income 24546 8.388 8 3.315 1 14
Labor force dummy 24546 0.671 1 0.470 0 1
Conservative ideology (100-point scale) 19333 -0.006 0 0.829 -1 1
Party id (3-point scale) 24546 55.249 51 27.278 0 100
Party id (7-point scale) 24546 3.992 4 2.187 1 7
ABC World News dummy 20354 0.100 0 0.300 0 1
CBS Evening News dummy 20354 0.076 0 0.265 0 1
CNN dummy 20354 0.103 0 0.304 0 1
Fox News dummy 20354 0.216 0 0.411 0 1
PBS The NewsHour dummy 20354 0.043 0 0.202 0 1
NBC Nightly News dummy 20354 0.132 0 0.338 0 1
MSNBC dummy 20354 0.050 0 0.218 0 1
Other networks dummy 20354 0.014 0 0.118 0 1
No evening news dummy 20409 0.266 0 0.442 0 1
Pick-up truck dummy 24426 0.337 0 0.473 0 1
Protestant dummy 24209 0.366 0 0.482 0 1
Catholic dummy 24209 0.206 0 0.404 0 1
Jewish dummy 24209 0.017 0 0.128 0 1
Muslim dummy 24209 0.002 0 0.044 0 1
Other religion dummy 24209 0.067 0 0.250 0 1
Other christian religion dummy 24209 0.151 0 0.358 0 1
No favorite religion dummy 24209 0.191 0 0.393 0 1
Church attendance 24210 1.164 1 1.268 0 3
Importance of religion 24452 0.683 1 0.465 0 1
County level
Population density, 2005 2280 0.030 0.006 0.196 0.00003 6.939
Unemployment rate, 2005 2273 5.364 5.100 1.608 1.9 16.000
Crime rate, 2004 2154 3.017 2.684 1.678 0 12.633
State level
Fraction of illegal immigrants, 2005 50 2.576 2.146 1.869 0.275 7.265
Fraction of legal immigrants, 2005 50 5.338 4.012 4.524 0.213 19.436
Notes: The pro_lenient_plan dummy equals one if the respondent would have voted in favor of the Senate Plan on illegal immigration, and zero if he/she
would have voted against. See the text for additional details. Party id equals one (minus one) if the respondent identifies himself/herself as a Republican
(Democrat), and zero for a self-identified Independent. 
Sources: the individual-levelvariables are taken from the CCES survey.The fraction of illegal immigrants per state in 2005 is the estimated number of illegal
immigrants (as calculated by the Pew Hispanic Center) divided by state population (as estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau). The fraction of legal
immigrants by state is computed as the difference between the number of foreign born individuals and the number of illegal immigrants, divided by state
population. County level variables are taken from the ICPSR Study No. 20660.dependent variable
estimation method probit probit probit probit probit probit probit
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Age -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.013***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Female dummy 0.034*** 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.01 0.006
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008]
Black dummy 0.075*** 0.016 0.002 0.008 0.01 0.001 0.006
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.019]
Latino dummy 0.225*** 0.221*** 0.209*** 0.203*** 0.205*** 0.212*** 0.219***
[0.019] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.021] [0.026] [0.026]
Immigrant origin 0.027*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.021***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
0.046*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.040***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
Income 0.001 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004** 0.004**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
- -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
- -0.051*** -----
[0.009]
Party id (7-point scale) - - -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.026***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
ABC dummy -0.046*** -0.031** -0.034** -0.032** -0.036** - -
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015]
CNN dummy -0.051*** -0.081*** -0.089*** -0.088*** -0.089*** - -
[0.018] [0.018] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
FOX News dummy -0.258*** -0.103*** -0.094*** -0.093*** -0.096*** - -
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
PBS dummy 0.226*** 0.151*** 0.139*** 0.137*** 0.136*** - -
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024]
NBC dummy -0.006 0.002 0 0 -0.003 - -
[0.015] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
MSNBC dummy 0.037 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 -0.021 - -
[0.025] [0.022] [0.021] [0.021] [0.022]
Other network dummy 0.008 0.004 0.01 0.008 0.009 - -
[0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.031]
No evening news dummy -0.103*** -0.040** -0.037** -0.038** -0.041** - -





Population density (county level) - - 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.028***
[0.008] [0.009] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008]
- - 0.007*** - - 0.007*** 0.007***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
- - -0.001 - - -0.002 -0.002
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
state fixed effects no no no yes no no no
DMA fixed effects no no no no yes no no
pseudo R squared 0.1 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.16
Observations 19401 19401 20422 20422 20409 13656 13656
Table 3: correlates of attitudes towards illegal immigration, baseline results
pro_lenient_plan dummy
Education
Conservative ideology (100-point scale)
Fraction of legal immigrants (state level)
Notes: The sample excludes all individualswho describe themselves as immigrants. The dependent variable is a dummy which takes on the value of one if the respondent would have voted in favor of the
Senate plan on illegal immigration,and zero otherwise. The panel contains the estimated marginal effect on the probabilityof being in favor of the Senate plan, given an increase in the value of the relevant
regressor, holdingall other regressors at their mean values. * Significantat 1%; ** significantat 5%; *** significantat 1%. Incomeis coded accordingto a 1-14 ordered scale of incomebrackets. Educationis
coded according to a 1-6 ordered scale, ranging from a value of 1 from high school dropouts to 6 for those holdinga post-graduate degree. The immigrant origin variable is coded as follows:1, parents and
grandparents were born in the US; 2, parents were born in the US but at least one grandparent is an immigrant; 3, at least one parent is an immigrant.Theconservativeideologyvariableis coded on a 0-100
scale, with 0 for extremely liberal views and 100 for extremely conservative ones.
The 3-pointscale variablefor party identificationtakes on a value of -1 for a Democrat, 0 for an Independentand 1 for a Republican.The 7-pointscale party id variabletakes on values on the 1-7 range, with 1
for a strong Democrat to 7 for a strong Republican.Each of the network dummy equals one when the respondent declares that he most frequentlywatches the eveningnews broadcast on network x, and zero
otherwise. CBS is the excluded network. The "no eveningnews" dummy equals one when the respodent declares that in the past week he never watched a nationaleveningnews program, and zero otherwise.
The count of stories on illegalimmigrationon the favorite evening news broadcast is the number of stories in 2005 where the expressions "illegalimmigration"or "illegalimmigrants"appear. Exploitingthe
Dow Jones Factivaarchive,this is done for ABC, CBS, CNN, Fox News, PBS and NBC. Populationdensity(in tens of thousands)is calculatedat the countylevelas the number of inhabitantsby square milein
2005. The state-specific fraction of illegal (and legal) immigrants is calculated for 2005, and is expressed in percentage points. 
Party id (3-point scale)
Count of stories on illegal immigration on the favorite 
news broadcast
Count of stories mentioning immigration, but not illegal 
one, on favorite broadcast
Fraction of illegal immigrants (state level)Table 4: media coverage of immigration on evening news broadcasts, 2006
search terms ABC CBS CNN FOX PBS NBC
(A): "immigrants" OR "immigration" 178 65 215 261 60 154
(B): "illegal immigrants" OR "illegal immigr 90 42 195 142 33 73
difference: (A) - (B) 88 23 20 119 27 81
Source: Dow Jones Factiva archive
channels
Notes: number of articles with the specified search terms, from January to October 2006. In the case of Fox News, searches are about the O'Reilly Factor. dependent variable
estimation method probit probit probit probit probit probit
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Pick-up truck dummy -0.055*** -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.052***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Protestant dummy - -0.065*** -0.058*** - -0.046*** -0.040**
[0.015] [0.016] [0.017] [0.018]
Catholic dummy - -0.061*** -0.050*** - -0.043*** -0.035**
[0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.016]
Jewish dummy - -0.014 -0.012 - 0.011 0.009
[0.029] [0.031] [0.034] [0.036]
Muslim dummy - -0.001 0.002 - 0.157 0.193
[0.067] [0.072] [0.127] [0.137]
Other religion dummy - -0.003 0.002 - -0.012 -0.015
[0.017] [0.018] [0.020] [0.021]
Other christian religion dummy - -0.077*** -0.069*** - -0.051*** -0.044**
[0.018] [0.019] [0.020] [0.021]
Church attendance - 0.026*** 0.025*** - 0.019*** 0.017***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Importance of religion - -0.006 -0.012 - 0.012 0.009
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013]
ABC dummy -0.034** -0.032** -0.038** - - -
[0.014] [0.015] [0.015]
CNN dummy -0.089*** -0.091*** -0.095*** - - -
[0.017] [0.017] [0.018]
FOX News dummy -0.094*** -0.091*** -0.098*** - - -
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
PBS dummy 0.139*** 0.131*** 0.123*** - - -
[0.023] [0.022] [0.023]
NBC dummy -0.001 0.002 -0.005 - - -
[0.016] [0.017] [0.017]
MSNBC dummy -0.021 -0.017 -0.019 - - -
[0.021] [0.021] [0.022]
Other network dummy 0.008 0.015 0.007 - - -
[0.030] [0.030] [0.029]
No evening news dummy -0.040** -0.043*** -0.050*** - - -
[0.017] [0.016] [0.017]
- - - -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
- - - -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Population density (county level) 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.021***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.005]
Crime rate, 2004 (county level) - - 0.009*** - - 0.008***
[0.002] [0.003]
Unemployment rate, 2005 (county lev - - -0.005* - - -0.005
[0.003] [0.003]
0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006* 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.006*
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
-0.002** -0.002* -0.001 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Socio economic and ideology cont. yes yes yes yes yes yes
pseudo R squared 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16
Observations 20357 19728 18466 13615 13157 12305
Notes: Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the state level, are shown under each marginal effect. * Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%. Socio economic and ideology controls are those included in regression 3, Table 3.
Table 5: Robustness checks
pro_lenient_plan dummy
Count of stories on illegal 
immigration on favorite broadcast
Count of stories mentioning 
immigration, on favorite broadcast
Fraction of illegal immigrants (state 
level)
Fraction of legal immigrants (state 
level)dependent variable
estimation method probit probit probit probit probit probit probit
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Age -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.012***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Female dummy 0.044*** 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.002 0
[0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.012] [0.011]
Black dummy 0.029 -0.024 -0.032 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.028
[0.031] [0.026] [0.023] [0.024] [0.023] [0.026] [0.027]
Latino dummy 0.200*** 0.171*** 0.169*** 0.165*** 0.166*** 0.139*** 0.148***
[0.016] [0.019] [0.020] [0.021] [0.023] [0.021] [0.022]
Immigrant origin 0.026*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.031*** 0.031***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007]
0.045*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.037***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Income 0.001 0.005** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.006*** 0.007***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
- -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
- -0.054*** - - - - -
[0.008]
Party id (7-point scale) - - -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.035*** -0.029***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
ABC dummy -0.039 0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 - -
[0.024] [0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.030]
CNN dummy -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.074*** -0.073*** -0.071*** - -
[0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019]
FOX News dummy -0.292*** -0.114*** -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.107*** - -
[0.014] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.021]
PBS dummy 0.189*** 0.131*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.125*** - -
[0.031] [0.032] [0.030] [0.029] [0.033]
NBC dummy -0.016 0.02 0.01 0.011 0.018 - -
[0.017] [0.020] [0.018] [0.019] [0.020]
MSNBC dummy -0.007 -0.031 -0.040* -0.040* -0.038 - -
[0.027] [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.024]
Other network dummy 0.014 0.041 0.028 0.026 0.031 - -
[0.050] [0.050] [0.050] [0.049] [0.054]
No evening news dummy -0.077*** 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.007 - -
[0.021] [0.023] [0.022] [0.022] [0.024]
- - - - - - -0.001***
[0.000]
- - - - - - -0.001***
[0.000]
Population density (county level) - - 0.014** 0.013** 0.022*** 0.006 0.011
[0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008]
-- 0 - - 0 0
[0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
- - 0.001 - - 0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
state fixed effects no no no yes no no no
DMA fixed effects no no no no yes no no
pseudo R squared 0.14 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.22 0.24
Observations 8430 8430 8879 8877 8801 5871 5871
Table A1: correlates of attitudes towards illegal immigration, baseline specification, 
question about Senate vs. House plan
pro_lenient_plan2 dummy
Education
Conservative ideology (100-point scale)
Fraction of legal immigrants (state level)
Notes: The sample excludes all individuals who describe themselves as immigrants. The dependent variable equals one if the respondent would have voted in
favor of the Senate plan, and zero if the respondent would have voted in favor of the House plan. The table contains the estimated marginal effect on
theStandard errors, adjusted for clustering at the state level, are shown under each coefficient. * Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
See Table 4 for the definition of the other variables.
Party id (3-point scale)
Count of stories on illegal immigration on the favorite 
news broadcast
Count of stories mentioning immigration, but not illegal 
one, on favorite broadcast
Fraction of illegal immigrants (state level)dependent variable
estimation method probit probit probit probit probit probit
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Age -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.009***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Female dummy 0 0.002 0.006 -0.002 0.001 0.003
[0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012]
Black dummy -0.040* -0.047** -0.049** -0.037 -0.044* -0.047*
[0.023] [0.022] [0.024] [0.027] [0.026] [0.029]
Latino dummy 0.171*** 0.179*** 0.176*** 0.150*** 0.151*** 0.145***
[0.021] [0.022] [0.024] [0.023] [0.025] [0.027]
Immigrant origin 0.016** 0.014** 0.014** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
0.040*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.032***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
Income 0.005** 0.004** 0.005** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
-0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Party id (7-point scale) -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.031***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Pick-up truck dummy -0.054*** -0.049*** -0.046*** -0.057*** -0.052*** -0.051***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013]
Protestant dummy - -0.059*** -0.060*** - -0.052** -0.054**
[0.016] [0.017] [0.021] [0.022]
Catholic dummy - -0.064*** -0.053*** - -0.066*** -0.058***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020]
Jewish dummy - 0.025 0.031 - 0.003 0.003
[0.034] [0.037] [0.042] [0.043]
Muslim dummy - 0.21 0.225 - - -
[0.304] [0.308]
Other religion dummy - -0.008 -0.005 - -0.028 -0.03
[0.022] [0.023] [0.031] [0.032]
Other christian religion dummy - -0.078*** -0.075*** - -0.086*** -0.084***
[0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.020]
Church attendance - 0.025*** 0.025*** - 0.026*** 0.025***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Importance of religion - -0.018 -0.019 - -0.017 -0.015
[0.014] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016]
ABC dummy -0.006 -0.003 -0.009 - - -
[0.028] [0.028] [0.029]
CNN dummy -0.075*** -0.079*** -0.076*** - - -
[0.018] [0.018] [0.019]
FOX News dummy -0.110*** -0.112*** -0.117*** - - -
[0.020] [0.021] [0.021]
PBS dummy 0.117*** 0.104*** 0.106*** - - -
[0.030] [0.030] [0.032]
NBC dummy 0.009 0.008 0.006 - - -
[0.019] [0.021] [0.021]
MSNBC dummy -0.042** -0.041* -0.038* - - -
[0.021] [0.022] [0.023]
Other network dummy 0.026 0.035 0.021 - - -
[0.051] [0.047] [0.045]
No evening news dummy 0 -0.005 -0.008 - - -
[0.022] [0.023] [0.024]
- - - -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
- - - -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Population density (county level) 0.010* 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.005
[0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.007] [0.008] [0.006]
Crime rate, 2004 (county level) - - 0.005 - - 0.007**
[0.004] [0.003]
Unemployment rate, 2005 (county level) - - -0.003 - - 0.004
[0.004] [0.003]
0.001 0 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
0 0 0.001 0 0 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
state fixed effects no no no no no no
DMA fixed effects no no no no no no
pseudo R squared 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.25
Observations 8840 8549 8007 5844 5639 5274
Table A2: correlates of attitudes towards illegal immigration, robustness checks, question about Senate 
vs. House plan
pro_lenient_plan2 dummy
The sample excludes all individuals who describe themselves as immigrants. The dependent variable equals one if the respondent would have voted in favor of the Senate plan,
and zero if the respondent would have voted in favor of the House plan. The panel contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being in favor of the Senate plan, 
given an increase in the value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean values. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the state level, are shown
under each marginal effect. * Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See Table 6 for the definition of the remaining variables.
Education
Conservative ideology (100-point scale)
Fraction of illegal immigrants (state level)
Fraction of legal immigrants (state level)
Count of stories on illegal immigration on the 
favorite news broadcast
Count of stories mentioning immigration, but not 
illegal one, on favorite broadcastdependent variable
labor force in out in out in out in out in out
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Age -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.013***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Female dummy 0.037*** 0.029*** 0.002 0.016* 0.002 0.015 0.002 0.016* 0.003 0.018*
[0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010]
Black dummy 0.071*** 0.089*** 0.012 0.032 -0.005 0.031 0 0.038 0.002 0.048
[0.020] [0.030] [0.020] [0.035] [0.019] [0.032] [0.022] [0.031] [0.021] [0.033]
Latino dummy 0.235*** 0.207*** 0.223*** 0.220*** 0.213*** 0.200*** 0.204*** 0.199*** 0.205*** 0.204***
[0.020] [0.035] [0.025] [0.039] [0.025] [0.038] [0.024] [0.039] [0.023] [0.041]
Immigrant origin 0.019** 0.038*** 0.012* 0.025*** 0.013* 0.027*** 0.015** 0.024*** 0.016** 0.027***
[0.007] [0.010] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008]
0.050*** 0.038*** 0.045*** 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.033*** 0.044*** 0.033*** 0.044*** 0.035***
[0.004] [0.008] [0.004] [0.008] [0.004] [0.008] [0.004] [0.008] [0.004] [0.008]
Income 0 0 0.005*** 0.003 0.005*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.002 0.006*** 0.002
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003]
- - -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
- - -0.056*** -0.038*** - - ----
[0.009] [0.012]
Party id (7-pt) - - - - -0.030*** -0.020*** -0.031*** -0.021*** -0.031*** -0.021***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005]
ABC dummy -0.019 -0.082*** 0.004 -0.073*** 0.002 -0.075*** 0.005 -0.074*** -0.003 -0.079***
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.023] [0.020] [0.023] [0.020] [0.023] [0.021] [0.026]
CNN dummy -0.036 -0.068** -0.066*** -0.092*** -0.071*** -0.102*** -0.070*** -0.099*** -0.075*** -0.098***
[0.023] [0.027] [0.022] [0.026] [0.021] [0.024] [0.020] [0.024] [0.021] [0.025]
FOX News dummy -0.259*** -0.235*** -0.104*** -0.093*** -0.091*** -0.089*** -0.090*** -0.086*** -0.097*** -0.089***
[0.016] [0.023] [0.018] [0.026] [0.017] [0.025] [0.017] [0.026] [0.018] [0.027]
PBS dummy 0.231*** 0.224*** 0.160*** 0.142*** 0.150*** 0.130*** 0.148*** 0.131*** 0.146*** 0.134***
[0.028] [0.030] [0.030] [0.031] [0.028] [0.033] [0.028] [0.034] [0.029] [0.038]
NBC dummy -0.008 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.006 -0.005 0.004
[0.024] [0.020] [0.025] [0.021] [0.024] [0.020] [0.024] [0.020] [0.026] [0.021]
MSNBC dummy 0.062** 0.003 0.007 -0.044* 0.006 -0.048* 0.004 -0.041 0.001 -0.048*
[0.031] [0.031] [0.028] [0.027] [0.026] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.028]
Other network dummy 0.066 -0.111** 0.053 -0.096** 0.058 -0.072 0.055 -0.071 0.056 -0.07
[0.043] [0.045] [0.046] [0.047] [0.043] [0.045] [0.044] [0.047] [0.046] [0.048]
No evening news dummy -0.093*** -0.131*** -0.03 -0.062*** -0.024 -0.063*** -0.025 -0.063*** -0.029 -0.067***
[0.019] [0.020] [0.020] [0.024] [0.020] [0.023] [0.020] [0.023] [0.021] [0.025]
- - - - 0.026*** 0.025** 0.028*** 0.028** 0.032*** 0.026**
[0.008] [0.011] [0.010] [0.012] [0.007] [0.011]
- - - - 0.005 0.010*** ----
[0.003] [0.003]
- - - - -0.001 -0.002* ----
[0.001] [0.001]
state fixed effects no no no no no no yes yes no no
DMA fixed effects no no no no no no no no yes yes
pseudo R squared 0.09 0.08 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.17
Observations 12294 6334 12294 6334 12958 6623 12958 6623 12928 6573
Notes:  The sample excludes all individuals who describe themselves as immigrants. The dependent variable is a dummy which takes on the value of one if the 
respondent would have voted in favor of the Senate plan on illegal immigration, and zero otherwise. The panel contains the estimated marginal effect on the 
probability of being in favor of the Senate plan, given an increase in the value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean values. 
Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the state level, are shown under each coefficient. * Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See 
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